As reported in The Canberra Times
November 24, 2014.
 |
If ramped-up mortgage borrowing isn't accompanied by bold and steady progress in modernising the economy, China will merely be creating another giant asset bubble, says William Pesek. Photo : Bloomberg |
The first Chinese interest-rate
cut
in more than two years is a stark recognition that the world's second-biggest economy is in trouble.
After years of piling ever more public debt onto the national balance
sheet
,
it makes sense to have the People's Bank of China take the lead in
propping up gross domestic product. Yet while Friday's benchmark rate
cut should help stabilise growth, the move also adds to worries about
looser credit that could pose risks to the global economy. Case in
point: mortgages.

Earlier this year, Chinese officials took several stealthy
steps aimed at stabilising the property sector and bolstering GDP
growth. The China Banking Regulatory Commission loosened lending
policies. Even before cutting the one-year lending rate to 5.6 per cent
and the one-year deposit rate to 2.75 per cent Friday, the central bank
had cut payment ratios and
mortgage rates
, while prodding loan officers to ease up on their reluctance to approve borrowers without local household registrations.
Pilot programs for mortgage-backed securities and real-estate
investment trusts got more support. Incentives were rolled out to
encourage high-end buyers to upgrade properties.
There's good news and bad in all this. The good: It marks
progress for President Xi Jinping's efforts to recalibrate China's
growth engines. In highly developed economies like the US., the quest
for homeownership feeds myriad growth ecosystems and offers the masses
ways to leverage their equity for other
financial
pursuits. And China's
debt problems
are in the public sphere, not among consumers. The bad: If ramped-up
mortgage borrowing isn't accompanied by bold and steady progress in
modernising the economy, China will merely be creating another giant
asset bubble.
"Expanding the underdeveloped mortgage market is not bad
news," says Diana Choyleva of Lombard Street Research. "But if China
relies on household credit to power the economy and pulls back from
much-needed financial reforms, the omens are not good."
Take the experience of South Korea after the 1997 Asian
crisis. With regulatory tweaks and a variety of ill-fated incentives,
Seoul effectively shifted the nation's debt burden from government to
families. By the early 2000s, fresh headwinds were intensifying; in
April 2004, one in 13 Koreans was three months or more behind on debt
payments. Of Korea, Choyleva says, "all it has to show for its efforts
are the mess left by a burst household-debt bubble and an economy even
more dependent on exports."
For all the grand talk of reining in state-owned enterprises
and the shadow banking system and tolerating a "new normal" of slowing
growth, Beijing remains intent on getting as
close
as possible to this year's 7.5 per cent GDP growth target. With Moody's
and S&P watching, and prominent economists like Larry Summers
arguing that China could soon slow to 4 per cent growth, officialdom is
looking for covert stabilisers. Among them: securitisation.
One of China's few reforms in the mid-2000s was
securitisation of loans, which began with a trial program in 2005. Three
years later, Wall Street's crash made the bundling and selling of loans
and assets a pariah among financial instruments, and the experiment was
shelved.
Since 2012, though, securitisation has not only returned but
flourished. According to Choyleva, issuance reached $US28 billion in the
first nine months of the year, compared with $US16 billion between 2005
and 2013. While most sales have been of auto, corporate and credit-card
debt, those of mortgage-based securities are rising. In July, the
Postal Savings Bank of China did the first residential mortgage-backed
deal in seven years, and the markets are buzzing about more to come.
These market rumours fit with the housing-as-stimulus narrative.
Risks abound, not least of which is the danger of helping
lenders to hide dodgy investments off balance sheet. If transparency was
a problem on Wall Street, imagine what state- coddled Chinese banks
could hide. Also, to avoid Korea's missteps, China would have to
complement this nascent mortgage boom with policies to redistribute
income toward consumers. That means working to narrow the gap between
rich and poor by increasing the average household's share of national
income and curbing a savings rate that is reaching excessive
proportions. While China has surpassed Japan in absolute GDP, its
distribution of gross household disposable income in GDP terms is tiny
by comparison.
There's much China could learn from Korea, including how to
beat the "middle-income trap" that befalls many developing nations when
they reach the $US10,000 per capita income level. Xi and his
lieutenants, though, should pay just as much attention to the country's
failures as its successes.